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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
ROY S. LUDLOW INVESTMENT 
COMPANY, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
-vs-
SALT LAKE COUNTY, et al., 
Defendants-Appellants• 
* * * 
CONSOLIDATED FREIGHTWAYS 
CORPORATION OF DELAWARE, 
Plaintiff in Intervention, 
-vs-
SALT LAKE COUNTY, 
Defendant in Intervention. 
Case No. 189102 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT SALT LAKE COUNTY 
NATURE OF CASE 
The original action in this case was an action in 
trespass against Salt Lake County by respondent to compel Salt 
Lake County to remove a road which respondent claimed was built 
on his land by Salt Lake County. After judgment was rendered 
in respondent's favor in the original action, respondent filed a 
supplemental complaint in trespass against Salt Lake County to 
recover the value of the road built by Salt Lake County which 
was removed by Salt Lake County from respondent's property after 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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the ori ginal judgmei it was ent .ered. 
' DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The lower court found Salt Lake County liable in the 
amount of $12,532.10 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant Sa] t Lake County seeks reversal of the 
lower court's judgment against Sait La^e ."ouivy :nci :r judgment 
di snii ssi ng respondent's sup'• rr*r; * - -\ - -- . i ma-
tive, Salt Lake County seeks rovti.su, M ; ne ,i,wu: , ou1 '- -*,dg-
ment and remand for a new trxai ^ A uu- *ssue ol damages, 
STATEMENT \)i /ACr. S 
. Septembei ** • * *, respondent oi ^.-i., the original 
action heroin against Sail Lake Counts, n i o c n v i that i t had 
* i t-s..w.-;s.- • ,i:» •« j % ding a piibl ic 
road . i c ros s mi- Ic-mu l o c a t e d .. WKI Mountain Viir* S u b d i v i s i o n , 
ft-1 He 'tsko'1 : - •
 f. com;)! i i n v th">t *-^* Court -y remove t h e 
r.ju v-* ."*tj^, -.. w« J:. *v* < • . .• . , . de fenda i i t s . 
In addition, Consolidated Freightways intervened as a plaintiff 
agai nst Salt Lake County, rhe road was located at 3200 West 
south of 2100 South : I I! w ; u ; 1 n li It 1 yy Sa I t Lake County i n ] 969. 
The street was dedicated as part of the Mountain View Subdivi-
sion,- which was rooo :-•-•» u 1888, MM Anqusr I), 1071, I he 
District Court entered judgment against Salt Lake County, holding 
that 3200 West had been abandoned under Secti on 1 116, Laws of 
Utah (1 8 98) whi c ih j: >. i: "ovi ded tl lat c i 1 ligl iwa} was < ieemed abandoned 
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which was not worked or used for a period of J. ivo year:-. 
R-80-82, Tl: ic i coi u: I < >rdere< I t h e re >a< i 1 e f t < :)pen t .o the publ i c 
, i ii order that the County could file condemnation proceedings, but 
if the County did not condemn, the respondent could apply to the 
court for appropri ate reli ef, R-82 . Tl la t: de< :i si on was affirmed 
by the Utah Supreme Court on July 14, 1 972, R-199. 
On October ] 8 , 1 972 , Sc iJ t Lake county employees, using 
heavy equipment, removed the road from, respondent's property 
and placed it on County property,, T. 286-290, On March 16, 
1 97 3 , respondent f i 1 ed a. mot i on to f I ] e a supp] emental corripla int, 
ut.jLCCjiru: uamages iw, remova. of the road by Sa] t Lake County. On 
March 2* , r>!>, respondent1 . -notion was granted. R-2 35. 
;-,.Dsequ-•• < >t , J.:-: ,».*,. . :-;e C o u n t y to dismiss the supple-
mental complaint ant: : or judgment on the pleadings were denied. 
R-2 4] • T : «; v..,, i : - < .«*.-••".---.nenta] comp] a !:".: . August 11, 
1 97 5, at w; **..:> * rii.«- L;IO Lowt:r court, awarded respondent damages 
i n the amount or" $; ' / ^ ^ i - ' z\n>- o^st: to repl ace the road. 
K.». j- M.d <, - \ : ,. , - — , . ; .\...|. .. .. , 3 $300.00 
the :wst o, :cpldc.n(] some •>a:vi,,/ \.<-rk io > K2~~J -3. The 
damages were based -,>'-*/! a • 3ii'ii::'j *:.u \:^ Co"* * H V S negligent. 
ri* lege negligencr. -A-^63. I C JS * cow :iis judgment and the 
denial of appellant1s moti ons to dismiss and ior judgment on 
the pleadings that Sa] t Lake County appeals. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
RESPONDENT'S CLAIM FOR DAMAGES IS NOT WAIVED UNDER THE UTAH 
GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT. 
Section 63-3 0-3 of Utah's Governmental Immunity Act 
provides that goveri imental ent i ti es ax c i :i mmune from suI t except 
as provided under the Act, This court has stated that the 
Governmental Inimun i ty Act i s to be stri ct] y appl ied to preserve 
the sovereign, immunity and to waive I t only as clearly expressed 
i n the Act, Holt v. State Road Commission, 30 u.2d 4, 511 P.2d 
] 28 7 (1 97 3), 
Utah Code Annotated 63-30-10, 1965, provides •'^; 
pertinent: 
I I W A I V E R Q F I M M U N I T Y F 0 R I N J U R Y C A U S E D B Y 
NEGLIGENT ACT OR ADMISSION OF E M P L O Y E E -
EXCEPTIONS—Immunity from suit of all 
governmental entities is waived for injury 
proximately caused by a negligent act or 
admission of an employee committed within 
the scope of his employment except if the 
injury: 
(1) Arises out of the exercise ox* 
performance or the failure to exercise or 
perform a discretionary function, whether 
or not the discretion is abused, or 
(2) Arises out of • :1 ntentional 
trespass • . " 
The meaning of the phrase "discretionary function" in 
the Utah Governmental Immun i ty Act, wh . r:\ i . patterned
 a f t e r t j l e 
Federal Torts Claims Act ("I J.S.C. 26:, ,-s u^en construed by 
tho courts numerous times. An act :i s considered a discretionary 
•': *• ••• t h i n I -ho r i i e a n i i K j <>l 1: ; h e G o v e n inie f I t a I r imnu. . * •• -i 
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requires deliberation and judgment and is made at a planning 
level rather than at the operational level where an act amounts 
only to carrying out decisions made at the planning level. 
Velasquez v. Union Pacific Railroad Co., 24 U.2d 217, 469 P.2d 
888 (1972); Carroll v. State, 27 U.2d 384, 496 P.2d 888 (1972); 
U.S. v. Gregory, 300 F.2d 11 (10th Cir. 1962). 
An important factor this court has considered in 
determining whether an act is discretionary is whether or not 
the decision is made at the level of government where basic 
governmental planning decisions are made* 
Thus, in Velasquez v. Union Pacific Railroad Co., 
supra, a decision by the Public Service Commission as to the 
type of safety devices it required the railroads to use was held 
to be a discretionary act and immune from suit under the Gov-
ernmental Immunity Act because it was a basic planning decision 
made by the governmental body authorized to make such decisions. 
The court noted the fact that the statute in question gives 
the Public Service Commission the power to require railroads to 
construct and maintain appropriate safety devices shows a legis-
lative intent to confer a discretionary act on the Public Service 
Commission. However, the case of Carroll v. State Road Com-
mission, supra, the Court held that a decision of a road 
supervisor to use earthen beams rather than signs as a means 
of protecting drivers from an abandoned road was a decision at 
the operational level. The court emphasized that the decision 
-5-Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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was not a basic planning decision of the Road Commission itself: 
"In the instant action, the decision of the 
road supervisor to use beams as the sole 
means of protection for the unwary traveler 
was not a basic policy decision essential to 
the realization or accomplishment of some 
basic governmental policy, program or 
objective. His decision did not require the 
exercise of basic policy evaluation, judgment, 
and expertise on the part of the Road Commis-
sion." 
In the case herein, the decision to remove the road 
by the County was made in a conference between the Salt Lake 
County Commissioners and a member of the Salt Lake County 
Attorney1s Office, who indicated that the County had three 
alternatives under the judgment of the court—to negotiate 
purchase of the land, to condemn the land, or to remove the 
road and place it on County property. (Deposition of 
Commissioner Ralph McClure, admitted into evidence, pp. 6-^ 12). 
The judgment of the County Commission was to remove the road. 
The decision was a planning decision by the governing body of 
the County and its legal advisor and certainly was a discre-
tionary act of judgment. This very act of removing the road is 
the basis of respondent's suit and not the operational manner in 
which it was removed. Thus, appellant Salt Lake County would 
submit it is immune from suit under the Governmental Immunity 
Act for the decision of the County Commission to remove the road 
if there was any negligence in such decision. If, on the other 
hand, the act of removing the road is construed as an intentional 
trespass because County employees went on the land of respondent, 
-6-Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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knowing the land was his, although believeing they had a right 
to do so, then the act is still not waived under the Govern-
mental Immunity Act, 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN ALLOWING RESPONDENT TO 
FILE A SUPPLEMENTAL COMPLAINT AFTER JUDGMENT AND APPEAL OF THE 
ORIGINAL CASE. 
The purpose of Rule 15 (d) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, which is identical to Rule 15(d) of the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure, is to allow a party to file a supplemental 
pleading to include transactions that have occurred since the 
original complaint. Supplemental complaints have been held 
proper even after judgment and appeal if the result of a 
supplemental complaint would not be to reopen a case. A good 
example of this is the case of North Point Consolidated Irri-
gation Co. v. Utah & Salt Lake Canal Co., 23 U. 199, 63 P. 812 
(1901), where the court upheld a supplemental complaint which 
was filed after an appeal had reversed a lower court judgment 
in a case where the issue of damages was reserved and further 
proceedings were already in order. 
However, supplemental pleadings have not been 
allowed where the result would be to open a case after trial. 
Thus, in Ebel v. Drum, 55 Fed. Supp. 186 (D. Mass. 1964), the 
court denied a motion of plaintiffs therein to file a supple-
mental complaint under Rule 15 (d) of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure where the result would have been to reopen the case: 
-7-Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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"Further, I do not believe the case should 
be reopened where, as here, it has been 
fully tried and a decree ordered but not 
filed." 
Similarly, where the supplemental complaint would allow new 
relief after final disposition of a matter, it has been held 
improper. Brill v. General Industries, 234 F.2d 465 (3d Cir. 
1956). 
The reasons for denying a supplemental complaint in 
this case are even more persuasive than in the cases cited. 
Here, final judgment had been entered by the trial court and 
affirmed by the Utah Supreme Court. If a supplemental complaint 
were proper after final disposition of a case by an appellate 
court where the case was not remanded for a new trial or further 
proceedings, then a case would never end as a party would continue 
litigation indefinitely through supplemental pleadings. 
POINT III 
RESPONDENT IS ESTOPPED FROM SEEKING DAMAGES FOR THE REMOVAL OF 
THE ROAD, HAVING ELECTED TO HAVE THE ROAD REMOVED. 
Paragraph 10 of respondent's First Cause of Action 
of the original complaint against the County reads as follows: 
"10. That the said defendant has and is 
trespassing upon plaintiff's property and has 
and is creating a public way across plaintiff's 
property and as such has created a nuisance, 
which nuisance should be abated and the defend-
ant restrained and enjoined from further 
creating and maintaining said nuisance." R-3. 
The prayer in respondent's original complaint reads: 
"That the court order the defendant 
Salt Lake County to abate the nuisance and 
remove the roadway from across plaintiff's 
property." R-4. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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Respondent did not ask for damages for the road being 
on his landf or did he introduce any evidence of damage at 
trial. The judgment provides that Salt Lake County should 
condemn or other appropriate relief will be granted. Because 
damages were not claimedr the only appropriate relief would have 
been for the court to order the road removed. There* is a well 
established principal of law that one is estopped from seeking 
inconsistent remedies for a wrong. Midvale Motors, Inc. v. 
Sanders, 19 U.2d 403, 432 P.2d 37 (1967); Farmers & Merchants 
Bank v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 4 U.2d 155f 289 P.2d 
1045 (1955). That is exactly what respondent has done in this 
case. First, he sued the County to remove the road, and then 
when the County removed the road, he sued for removing the 
road. The two actions are inconsistent and, therefore, respond-
ent should be estopped under the doctrine of res judicata from 
prevailing on the supplemental complaint. 
POINT IV 
THE COUNTY HAD AN EQUITABLE RIGHT IN THE ROAD ASIDE FROM THE 
FACT RESPONDENT ASKED SALT LAKE COUNTY IN HIS COMPLAINT TO 
REMOVE IT. 
Although generally under the common law, improve-
ments placed upon the land belong to the owner of the land, 
there are exceptions to this rule. Under the Occupying 
Claimants Act, Utah Code Annotated 57-6-1, et seq., a land-
owner who, under color of title and in good faith, places an 
improvement upon another's land, may sue to recover the value 
-9-Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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of the improvement. Generally, such statutes are not exclusive 
remedies [Citizens & Southern National Bank v. Modern Homes 
Construction, 149 S.E.2d 326 (S. C. 1966); Tolson v. Madisony 
307 S.W.2d 32 (Mo. 1957); Pritchard Petroleum Co. v. Farmers 
Co-Op Oil and Supply Co., 190 P.2d 55 (Mont. 1938)], and under 
the common law, equity will not allow a landowner to be unjustly 
enriched by improvements on his own land placed by another and 
will permit a suit in equity to remove improvements by one who 
has mistakenly placed them on another man's land. Citizens & 
Southern National Bank v« Modern Homes Construction, supra; 
Salazar v. Garcia, 222 S.W.2d 685 (Tex. App. 1950); Tolson v. 
Madison, supra. The exception to the common law principle is 
stated in Citizens & Southern National Bank v. Modern Homes 
Construction Co., supra, as follows: 
"If the plaintiff is allowed to remove the 
building, the defendant would be deprived 
of nothing to which he is unjustly enriched 
and would be compensated for any damage that 
might result from the removal of the build-
ing. Both parties would be made whole. It 
would be clearly inequitable, under the 
facts alleged, to allow the defendant to be 
enriched by the construction of the build-
ing on his land . . . ." 
Defendant Salt Lake County did not avail itself of either of 
these remedies because it believed it was already obligated to 
remove the road under the judgment if it did not condemn. 
However, even if it misconstrued the judgment, plaintiff should 
not be unjustly enriched by receiving $12,000.00 for a road 
-10-
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which cost him nothing and which had no value as an improvement 
on respondent's land. Rather, damages should be limited to any 
damage to respondent's land from the removal of the road. 
POINT V 
DAMAGES AWARDED BY THE TRIAL COURT WERE EXCESSIVE AND IMPROPERLY 
MEASURED. 
The trial court awarded damages solely on the basis 
of testimony by respondent's expert as to what the cost to 
replace the road was estimated to be. No evidence was intro-
duced by respondent that the road was of any value to him or that 
its removal decreased the value of his property. Even assuming 
that Salt Lake County misconstrued the pleadings and judgment in 
respondent's original lawsuit and had no right to remove the 
road, and further assuming that the County had no equitable claim 
to the road, the court still granted excessive damages which were 
improperly measured. 
No single measure of damages has been applied in cases 
where structures on real property have been destroyed. The 
proper measure of damage for damage to improvements on real 
property is often the difference between the value of the land 
before and after the damage. The basic goal of the courts in 
such cases is to award such amount of money as to restore the 
injured party to the same property status which he occupied 
immediately prior to the injury. Alonzo v. Hills, 95 Cal. 
App.2d 788, 214 P.2d 50; McCabe v. Parkersburg, 138 W. Va. 830, 
-11-
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79 S.E.2d 87 (1953); 22 Am. Jur.2d Damages § 138. When courts 
have allowed a different measure of damages to be used other 
than change in value in the land, it has been to get more 
directly at the damage done. In this case, measuring damages 
in any way other than the change in value in the land would have 
just the opposite effect—that of giving respondent a windfall 
at the expense of the taxpayers of Salt Lake County. The road 
cost respondent nothing, he asked that it be removed, he offered 
no evidence that its removal damaged him in any way, other than 
removal of some survey stakes, or that the road in any way 
benefited his land. In essence, he has been unjustly enriched 
in the amount of $12,532.10. To avoid such a result, damages 
should have been awarded on the basis of the change in the value 
of respondent's land by the removal of the road. A good analogy 
to this situation is the method of determining the value of an 
improvement under the Occupying Claimants Act. Under that Act, 
the value of improvements mistakenly placed on anotherfs land 
when one is claiming the value of such improvement is "a differ-
ence between the reasonable relative values of the land with and 
without the improvements". Reimann v. Baum, 115 U. 147, 203 
P.2d 387 (Utah 1949). In that case the court stated: 
"The reasonable cost of the improvements 
alone is not sufficient evidence of 
value but such cost may be considered with 
all other evidence of value in determining 
the increase in value of the land on 
account of the improvements. The obvious 
reason of this rule is to limit liability 
of a landowner on whose land an improvement 
-12-
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has been placed by another by mistake to 
the amount he has been unjustly enriched." 
Here, the same principle is applicable in reverse. To allow 
respondent to recover $12,000.00, the cost of the road, where he 
has shown no actual damage to his land and where the road cost 
him nothing, is to unjustly enrich him and is an excessive 
finding as to damage not warranted by the evidence. 
CONCLUSION 
The award by the trial court of damages against Salt 
Lake County in excess of $12,000.00, when no evidence was pre-
sented to the trial court of any actual loss suffered by respon-
dent, is tantamount to an award of punitive damages against the 
public for the discretionary act of the County Commissioners of 
removing a road which respondent had asked the County to remove 
in his original complaint. Appellant Salt Lake County would 
submit that this result is not supportable under the law for 
numerous reasons. First, because the act of the County was in 
compliance with the prayer in respondent's complaint and the 
judgment, the County was entitled, if not obligated, to remove 
the road under the pleadings and judgment of the original case 
and, therefore, respondent is estopped under the doctrines of 
election of remedies and res judicata from the subsequent law-
suit. Secondly, because the act was a discretionary act on the 
part of the Commissioners, the County is protected from lia-
-13-
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bility under the Governmental Immunity Act. Further, there is 
no evidence of any negligence on the part of the officials of 
the County in the decision to remove the road, and it was 
improper for the court to make a finding of negligence when the 
case was not even tried on the theory of negligence• 
Even if the supplemental complaint was proper, the 
damages awarded to respondent have no relationship to any actual 
damage he suffered. Because the road cost respondent nothing 
and there is no evidence that it benefited his land in any 
way, damages should be limited to any damage done to his prop-
erty in removing the road to avoid unjustly enriching him at the 
expense of the County. In the alternative, the court should 
have awarded damages on the basis of the decrease in the value 
of respondent's land instead of on the basis of the cost of 
replacing the road. 
For these reasons, appellant Salt Lake County asks 
that the judgment of the lower court be reversed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
Salt Lake County Attorney 
DONALD SAWAYA 
Chief Civil Deputy County Attorney 
KENT S. LEWIS 
Deputy County Attorney 
Attorneys for Defendant-Appellant 
Salt Lake County 
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